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Plaintiff and Appellant Energy Management Services, LLC ("Plaintiffs")
respectfully submits this Reply Brief.
I. ARGUMENT
A. This Court's Recent Reversal Of The Order Granting Summary
Judgment In The Third District Action Requires That The Trial
Court's Grant Of Summary Judgment In This Action Be Summarily
Reversed.
It is undisputed that (1) the Trial Court's grant of summary judgment in this matter
was based solelv on the Trial Court's conclusion that Plaintiffs' claims in this matter
were barred by resjudicata as a result of the order granting summary judgment that
previously had been entered in the Third District Action; and (2) after the Trial Court
entered its order granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment in this action, this
Court reversed the judgment previously entered in the Third District Action {see Energy
Management Services, LLC v. Shaw, 2005 UT App 90, 110 P.3d 158). Under these
circumstances, the Trial Court's decision must be summarily reversed and the case
should be remanded for trial. See e.g., Ron Shepherd Ins. v. Mayer, 883 P.2d 1358 (Utah
1994); Sandy City v. Salt Lake County, 827 P.2d 227, 230-31 (Utah 1992).
In its Opposition Brief, Del Rio does not contest the above-referenced facts and
does not address the above-referenced case law. Instead, Del Rio provides only a cursory
1On July 2, 2004, the Trial Court granted a Motion to Substitute Energy Management
Services, LLC for the Plaintiffs in this case. The Motion for Summary Judgment and
Memorandum in Support thereof refer to "Plaintiffs" in the plural and Defendants'
argument requires comparisons between this action andan earlier action in which there
were Plaintiffs. To avoid confusion, therefore, this brief also refers to appellant EMS as
"Plaintiffs" and to Defendants Del Rio Resources, Inc. and Del Rio Drilling Programs,
Inc. collectively as Del Rio. Defendant Dan K. Shaw will be referred to as "Shaw."
response to Plaintiff;' argument concerning the effect of the reversal of thejudgment in
the Third District Action. See, Defs.' Opp'n Br. at pp. 11-12.
Del Rio's cursory argument attempts to trivialize this Court's reversal of the
summaryjudgment in the Third District Action. Del Rio's claim that "the District
Court's ruling that the Plaintiffs' claim to the Leases fails as a matter of law remains
intact" (Opp'n Br. at 12) is simply incorrect. In reversing the entry of summa-ry judgment
in the Third District Action, this Court did not endorse or affirm the Trial Court's ruling
on the merits. Rather, this Court expressly stated that it "need not address the substance
of the parties' summaryjudgment arguments as we conclude that EMS is entitled to have
the Trial Court consider and rule on its request for additional discovery." Energy
Management Services, 110 P.3d at 160.
By definition, the reversal of the summaryjudgment in the Third District Action
rendered that judgment of no further force or effect and eliminated the bas's for the Trial
Court's finding of resjudicata in this action. See Phebus v. Dunford, 114 Utah 292, 198
P.2d 973, 974 (Utah 1948) (A reversal of a judgment or decision of a lower court such as
this places the case in the position it was in before the lower court rendered that judgment
or decision, and vacates all proceedings and orders dependent upon the decision which
was reversed). As a result, the Trial Court's judgment in this case also must be reversed
and the case must be remanded to the Trial Court for further proceedings. Ron Shepherd,
883 P.2d at 1358; Sandy City, 827 P.2d at 230-31; see also, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JuxiMENTS, § 16, cmt. C (1982) ("If, when the earlier judgment is set aside or reversed, .
. . an appeal has been taken and remains undecided, a party may inform the trial or
appellate court of the nullification of the earlier judgment and the consequent elimination
of the basis for the later judgment. The court should then normally set aside the later
judgment.").
The mere fact that the Third District Action was remanded to the Trial Court for
further proceedings consistent with this Court's opinion does not limit the impact of the
reversal on this case. In both the Ron Shepherd case and the Sandy City case, the fact that
the earlier judgment had been reversed and remanded to the Trial Court for further
proceedings consistent with this Court's decisions did not prevent this Court from
reversing the second judgment which was based on the res judicata or collateral estoppel
effect of the first judgment. Plaintiffs believe that they will prevail on remand in the
Third District Action. Obviously, Del Rio disagrees. However, until the Court has ruled
once again on the merits in the Third District Action, there simply is no viable judgment
on the merits upon which a finding of resjudicata can be based.
Del Rio's suggestion that this Court should not give any effect to the reversal of
the judgment in the Third District Action because Del Rio anticipates that "the
proceedings on the Rule 56(0 affidavit will be completed, and the Third District Court
judgment reinstated, well before proceedings on this appeal are completed" (Opp'n Br. at
12) is based entirely on unfounded speculation.2 Plaintiffs have renewed their Rule 56(0
Motion.3 Additionally, on July 20, 2005, Plaintiffs filed a new Motion to Amend their
2 Del Rio's use of the term "reinstated" shows that Del Rio recognizes that the reversed
judgment in the Third District Action has no present validity or effect.
3The judgment in the Third District Action was reversed on February 25, 2005, with the
remittur being issued on May 5, 2005. The Trial Court granted Plaintiffs' Rule 56(0
Complaint with the Trial Court.4 Del Rio apparently believes that the trial court will
deny Plaintiffs' Rule 56(0 Motion and then reinstate its Order granting summary
judgment. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, believe that the trial court will grant the Rule
56(0 Motion and the Motion to Amend5 and that Plaintiffs ultimately will prevail at trial.
At this point in these proceedings, there simply is no way to predict with certainty how
the trial court will rule in the Third District Action. Under these circumstances, Plaintiffs
respectfully submit that the above-cited case law requires that the Trial Court's judgment
in this action be reversed and that the case be remanded to the Trial Court for further
proceedings. At a minimum. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the proceedings in this
appeal must be stayed pending issuance of a final judgment in the Third District Action.
See Restatement (Second) of Judgments, § 16, cmt. B (suggesting that it may be
advisable for the court that is being asked to apply an earlier judgment as res judicata to
Motion by Minute Order dated July 12, 2005. However, because as a result of a clerical
error, counsel for Del Rio never received a copy of Plaintiffs' renewed Rule 56(0
Motion, the parties have stipulated that the Trial Court should vacate its Ju'.y 12, 2005
Order and rule again on the Rule 56(0 Motion after it is fully briefed and submitted for
decision by the parties.
4On November 12, 2002, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to File a First Amended Complaint in
the Third District Action. Judge Livingston did not address or rule on the Motion to
Amend. Instead, on November 14, 2002, Judge Livingston issued his order granting
summaryjudgment in the Third District Action. Plaintiffs appealed that Order.
Thereafter, by Minute Order dated March 29, 2003, a copy of which is attached hereto as
Exhibit A and is incorporated herein by reference, Judge Hilder denied Plaintiffs' Motion
to Amend on the grounds that Plaintiffs' appeal of the Order granting summaryjudgment
deprived the Court ofjurisdiction to rule on the Motion to Amend. In his Order, Judge
Hilder stated, among other things, that if Plaintiffs "prevail on appeal and the matter is
returned to this Court, amendment is likely available."
'^ If Plaintiffs1 Motior to Amend their Complaint in the Third District Action is granted, it
should render the issues raised in this case moot.
stay its own proceedings while awaiting the ultimate disposition of the earlier case, either
in the trial court or on appeal.)6
B. Del-Rio Did Not Establish At Trial The Elements Necessary To Invoke
The Doctrine Of Res Judicata.
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs do not believe that it is necessary for this
Court to address or determine at this time "whether the trial judge was correct in holding
that the criteria for [res judicata] were met, since the decision relied upon for the finding
of [resjudicata] has been overturned in the [Third District Action]." See Sandy City, 827
P.2d at 230. Nevertheless, in the event that this Court believes it is necessary or
appropriate to address this issue at this time, Plaintiffs respectfully submit the following
argument.
The parties seem to agree, and the law is clear, that the claim preclusion branch of
resjudicata bars a subsequent claim only if the movant demonstrates the existence of the
following three factors: (1) both cases involve the same parties or their privy; (2) the first
suit resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the claim was either (a) presented
in the first suit, or (b) could have and should have been presented in the first suit. Sec
() Comment B to RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OE JUDGMENTS, § 16 states that "This course
commends itself if the disposition will not be long delayed and especially if there is
substantial doubt whether the judgment will be upheld." In this case, there certainly is
substantial doubt concerning whether the reversed judgment in the Third District Action
ever will be reinstated. There is no assurance, however, that resolution of the Third
District Action on remand "will not be long delayed." As a result, Plaintiffs respectfully
submit that reversal of the judgment in this action is the better course. Nevertheless,
simultaneously with the filing of this Reply Brief, Plaintiffs have filed a Motion to Stay
these proceedings in the event that this Court believes that it is more appropriate to stay
the proceedings, rather than to simply reverse the judgment, pending a final judgment in
the Third District Action.
e.g., Maoris & Assoc, v. Noways, Inc., 2000 UT 93,1|20, 16 P.3d 1214. Plaintiffs
conceded the existence of the first two factors in the Trial Court. Thus, the focus of the
argument is whether Del Rio properly established the existence of the third factor before
the Trial Court. Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the Del Rio did not, and cannot,
establish the existence of the third factor.
1. Plaintiffs' Current Claims Were Not Presented In The Third
District Action.
Contrary to Eel Rio's argument, all of Plaintiffs' claims in this action were not
presented in the Third District Action. The Complaint in the Third District Action
presented a single claim for declaratory judgment. R. 239-293. The Complaint in this
case presented three different claims - quiet title, constructive trust, and breach of joint
venture partnership - and did not reassert: the declaratory judgment claim already
determined in the Third District Action. R. 2-9. Although it is true that the quiet title
claim and the constructive trust claim in the Complaint in this action sought an interest in
the same Leases in which Plaintiffs sought an interest in the Third District Aciion,
Plaintiffs' alternative: claim for breach of joint venture partnership in this case sought
only damages - which is different from the relief that h£.d been sought in the Third
District Action." Thus, contrary to Del Rio's argument, Plaintiffs have not sought the
' Plaintiffs' concession of the existence of a final judgment on the merits in the first
action was subject to Plaintiffs' noting that the judgment in the Third District Action was
on appeal. For the reasons set forth above, the reversal of the judgment in the Third
District Action by ths Court has changed things so that there now no longer is a final
judgment on the mer.ts that can serve as the basis for res judicata.
hThe Complaint in the Third District Action also included a request for "money
damages", R. 293, but this simply was a reference to the same res which was the subject
same relief in this action that they sought in the prior Third District Action, and Plaintiffs
cannot be viewed as having actually presented the same claims in this action as were
presented in the Third District Action.
2. Although Plaintiffs Could Have Presented All Of The Claims
Asserted In This Action In The Third District Action, They
Were Not Required To Do So.
Del Rio argues at length that all of Plaintiffs' claims in this action should be
barred by resjudicata because all of these claims supposedlycould have and should have
been raised in the Third District Action. Del Rio's arguments cannot withstand analysis.
a. Del Rio's Reliance On The AEM And Wheadon Cases
Ignores The Utah Supreme Court's More Recent Decision
In Macris.
Del Rio relies heavily in this Court's 1999 decision in American Estate
Management v. Int'l Investment &Development Corp., 1999 UT App. 232, 986 P.2d 765
("AEM') and the Utah Supreme Court's 1962 decision in Wheadon v. Pearson, 14
Utah.2d 45, 376 P.2d 946 (1962). These cases did involve the application ofres judicata
principles. However, after these cases were decided, the Utah Supreme Court issued its
decision in Macris. Thus, it is Macris, and not AEMor Wheadon, which provides the
of Plaintiffs' declaratory judgment claim, i.e. the monetary proceeds recovered in the
Claims Court Litigation. The claim for breach ofjointventure partnership in this action
does not seek a declaratory judgment or damages relating to the Claims Court Litigation
proceeds. Rather, through the alternative claim for breach ofjoint venture partnership in
this case Plaintiffs seekan accounting in damages relating to their interest in all assets of
the joint venture.
most recent guidance to this Court from the Utah Supreme Court concerning resjudicata
principles.
As noted in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, Macris specifically holds that claim
preclusion applies only where there is an identity of facts and evidence between the
claims presented in the two actions. Macris, 2000 UT at| 28, 16 P.3d at 1221 (". . . the
cause of action in the present suit must be identical to the one brought in the prior suit.").
In determining whether claims are identical for resjudicata purposes, the focus is upon
whether the two causes of action rest on a different state of facts and evidence of a
different kind or character is necessary to sustain the two causes of action. Id. Moreover,
even if a plaintiff is aware of the factual basis of a suit at the time of filing another suit,
he or she is not required to bring all claims together if there is no identity of facts and
evidence between tfo two claims. Id.
Del Rio seems to acknowledge, as it must, that the claims asserted by Plaintiffs in
this case contain different elements and require different proof than the declaratory relief
Del Rio attempts to chastise Plaintiffs for not addressing AEM in their opening brief.
Plaintiffs did not address AEM because Plaintiffs thought it was more appropriate to
focus on the Utah Supreme Court's more recent decision in Macris.
claim asserted by Plaintiffs in the Third District Action.10 Thus, under the rules set forth
in Macris, application of resjudicata in this case was inappropriate. 11
b. The Mere Fact That Macris Did Not Involve Claims To
Interests In Real Property Does Not Render Its Holding
Inapplicable To This Case.
Del Rio attempts to distinguish Maoris on the grounds that it did not involve
claims to interests in real property. This effort fails because, although the facts in Macris
did not involve an interest in real property, the case primarily relied upon in Macris,
Schaer v. State, 657 P.2d 1337 (Utah 1983), did involve claims to interests in real
property. The Utah Supreme Court's reliance on its holding in Schaer in its decision in
Macris shows that the Utah Supreme Court believes that the same principles governing
resjudicata apply regardless of whether a case involves interest in real property or some
other interests.
lU The focus of the Third District Action was the parties' rights and obligations under the
1995 Agreement and the relating funding agreement subsequently entered into between
Plaintiffs Dan Shaw and Del-Rio Resources, Inc. The claims in this action arise out of a
joint venture agreement which predated the 1995 Agreement and the related funding
agreement. Thus, the proof required in this case will be fundamentally different from that
which was (and will be) submitted in the Third District Action.
11 Del Rio argues that this Court should ignore the Utah Supreme Court's statements in
Macris because these statements supposedly are mere dicta. This is not the case. Rather,
the Utah Supreme Court presented two alternative explanations in Macris for why res
judicata did not apply. Each of the alternative explanations offered by the Utah Supreme
Court is equally viable, and each of these explanations is binding on this Court. See Utah
Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm n of Utah, 73 Utah 199, 273 P. 306, 309 (Utah 1928)
(Where an appellate court bases its decision on two or more distinct grounds, each is as
much an authoritative determination as the other, and neither can be disregarded as
dictum); Jones v. Mutual Creamery Co., 81 Utah 223, 17 P.2d 256. 258 (Utah 1932)
(Where two grounds are argued, presented, and involved, on either of which court's
decision can be rested, and both are sustained, ruling on neither is "dictum").
In Schaer, the Utah Supreme Court held that resjudicata did not apply where the
two causes of action rested on a different state facts and evidence of a different kind or
character would be necessary to sustain them, and where the two causes of action related
to the status of property in two different time periods. Schaer, 657 P.2d at 1340. This
case presents a similar situation. As noted above, the causes of action in the Third
District Action and in this case are based on completely different facts and circumstances,
which occurred during completely different time periods.12 Given the similarities
between this case ard Schaer, the rule adopted by the L'tah Supreme Court in Schaer,
which has been recently reaffirmed by the Utah Supreme Court's reliance on Schaer in
Maoris, should apply in this case.
c. Even If This Court Concluded That Plaintiffs' Claims To
An Interest In The Leases Were Barred By Res Judicata,
This Would Not Bar Plaintiffs' Damages Claim.
For the reasons set forth above, Plaintiffs respectfully submit that the rule set forth
in Maoris applies to this case. However, even if this Court somehow were to conclude
that different, broader rules for resjudicata were to apply to claims for interests in real
property, ~res judicata still would not bar all of Plaintiffs' claims in this case. As noted
above. Plaintiffs' alternative claim for breach of joint venture agreement in this case
seeks monetary damages, not a specific interest in the Leases. Accordingly, even if this
Court somehow concluded that Plaintiffs'' claims for quiet title and constructive trust (to
" As a result, the facts in this case are much more similar to the facts in Schaer than the
facts presented in cither AEM or Wheadon.
For example, if this Court were to conclude that AEM establishes different, broader
rules for resjudicata in cases involving claims to interests in real property than are set
forth in Maoris.
10
the extent that the constructive trust claim seeks an interest in the Leases in question)
were barred by resjudicata, this would not justify barring Plaintiffs' alternative claim for
damages on the basis of resjudicata. Indeed, Del Rio seems to acknowledge in its
Opposition Brief that a claim for damages should and will be treated differently from a
claim to an interest in real property for resjudicata purposes. See, Opp'n Br. at p. 21.
Thus, at the very most, resjudicata could only apply to bar Plaintiffs' claims in this
action for an interest in the Leases in question, and not Plaintiffs' alternative claim for
damages for breach of the joint venture agreement.
II. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, and in Plaintiffs' Opening Brief, the Trial Court's
entry of summaryjudgment against Plaintiffs should be reversed and this case should be
remanded for trial.
Respectfully submitted this Tjfaay of August, 2005.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
Max D. "^Jjceler
Stanley J. Preston
Bryan M. Scott
Attorneys for Plaintiff'Appellant Energy
Management Sendees, LLC
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dismissing, all claims'^'" ~
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. sal ;.is;npwj!the>ubjecVfof "plaintiffs' *nr„Ur^Judge Livingston did ^ive plaintiffs^leave^o^amenl their Complaint•
and add a new claim against defendant Dan K."Shaw, but that has no •
effect on any claim against Del-Rio. This court does not belief
that it has the ability to grant the Motion. Contrary to
plaintiffs' argument, a final Order of dismissal, on the merits and
disposing of all claims against that defendant, which is now on
appeal, is not subject to revision by the trial court, unbless the
matter is somehow remanded to the trial court and made the subiect
of an appropriate "post-trial" motion. That is simply not the
posture of this case. Plaintiffs are probably right on two points
they urge: First, if they prevail on appeal and the matter is
returned to this court, amendment is likely available. Second if
the statute of limitations has not run, they can file an
independent action, if their new claim does, in fact, have an
independent basis. What they cannot do is amend their claim'
against Del-Rio in this action at this time. The Motion be and
hereby is DENIED. This signed Minute Entry shall be the ORDER of
the court and no further Order is required. ———
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Uriff's and Other Related Documents
Supreme Court of I hah.
MACRIS & ASSOCIAPHS. INC.. Plaintiff and
Respondent.
v.
M WAVV INC.. I nomas F. Mower, and Leslie 1)
Mower. Defendants and Petitioners.
No. 990859.
Dec 5.2000.
Marketing eompans brought action against succcsmu
health and beautv company for fraudulent transfer,
successor liability, and alter ego. 1he Fourth District
Cour!. Pro\o Department, Howard Maetam J .
granted summars judgment to health and beauts
compans Marketing companv appealed. The C. ouri
of Appeals, c;So . jf^LLJ^J^ reversed. Corporation
sought certiorari res iew. The Supreme Court.
!<;;-.-.<M!. Associate C J . held that" ( 1 ) action was not
b.irred hs doctrir.e of res mdicata. but (2i claims \o\
additional cortrac: damages ssere barred b> doctiinc
of issue preclusion.
.Affirmed in pari and reversed in part
\\ est Headnote-.
Hi Certiorari £^(,4(1)
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When cvera-ms; its certiorari jurisdiction. Supreme
Lour; reviews the decision of the court of appeals,
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certiorari lurisdicfion. Supreme Court accords no
particular deference to the conclusions of lass made
bs the court of appeals but reviews them tor
correctness
|3| Judgment ^--'540
22Sk.Mn Most_Cited t ases
Claim preclusion involves the same parlies or their
pnsic-. and also the same cause of action, and lim-
pieCade-- the relitigation of all issues that coaid h.asc
been htiiiutea as well as those that were, in t.Kt.
age I
litigated in the prior action.
141 Judgment €^634
228kh34 Most.Cited Cases
Issue preclusion arises from a different cause of
action and prevents parties or Iheir privies from
reinitiating facts and issues in the second suit that
ssere full\ litigated in the first suit
|5| Judgment €-r~>540
22SkM() MosLCiied.tlases
In order for claim preclusion to bar a subsequent
cause of action, a plaintiff must satist> three
requirements' first, both cases iihm involve the same
parties or their privies: second, the claim that is
alleged to be barred must have been presented in the
first suit or must be one that could and should have
been raised in the first action, third, the first suit must
have resulted in a final judgment on the merits
jfjj. Judgment €^"13(2)
:2Sk"13r2j Most Cited Case-
Partv is required to include claims m action, tor res
mdicata purposes, onls if those chums arose before
filing of complaint in first action
J21 Judgment €^-n3(2)
22 Sk"? I3(2J Most (died (-.a>s^
Res judicata did not bar claim- against successor
corporation for fraudulent transfer. successor
habihts. and alter ego. tacts giving rise to plaintiffs
claims, which included predecessor's transfer of its
assets to successor and successor's subsequent
takeover of predecessor's business did not arise until
after tiling of complaint in first action against
successor, and claims in .second action rested upon
different set of facts than breacli of contract litigation
that was the subject of the first action
J_SJ Judgment €>"^5S5( 1)
:_2,Sk585LL Most (died t.'ase^.
1*1 Judgment £=3713(1)
22Sk71_3Mj MosUdted (".ase^
For the doctrine ot" res judicata to preclude a
subsequent cause of action, not onl> must the
plaintiff have been aware of the cause of action at the
time the first suit was commenced, hut the cause of
action in the present -ait mast be identical to the one
brought in the prior suit
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J9J Action <^??3(I)
J3k>3(l} Most Cited Case_
Kven if a plaintiff is aware of the factual basis of a
suit at the filing of another suit, he or she is noi
obligated to bring all clains together if there is no
identitv of facts and evidence between the twt>
claims
1101 Judgment €^744
228K74-4 MosjJ itcd Cases
Determination that plaintiff's claims in second action
were not barred b\ claim preclusion did not preclude
determination that plaintiff was prevented by doctrine
of issue preclusion or collateral estoppel from
seeking additional contract damages aiising from fust
action.
J211 Judgment 0=>634
22_Kk6_14 Mqst.Citcd Cases
Four-part test is applied to determine whether
doctrine of issue preclusion is applicable: first, the
issue challenged must be identical in the previous
action and in the case at hand; second, the issue must
have been decided m a final judgment on the merits
in the previous action: thirc. the issue must have been
competently, fulls, and fairly litigated in the previous
action; and fourth, the parts' against whom collateral
estoppel is invoked in the current action must have
been either a party o" privy to a party in the previous
action.
U21 Judgment €^651
22Sk(ol Most Cited Cases
|121 Judgment 0^744
22Sk"M4 \1os_: Cited Cases
In action asaainst corporation for fraudulent transfer.
successor liability, and Titer ego. plaintiff was
precluded, under doctrine of collateral estoppel, from
seeking contract damages ii addition lo those sought
in prior breach of contract action, even though issue
ot contract damages was decided b\ stipulation in
first action; issue id' damages resulting from breach
was decided in first aetior, that award of damages
was final, plaintiff had full opportunity to develop its
claim in first action, and phintiff was a parts to both
actions.
1121 Judgment £=720
22__k;720 MostCited <discs
The general rule precluding the relitigation ot'
material tacts or question- which were in issue di\<.\
adjudicated in a former ac ion extends to questions
Pas'e 2
necessarils involved in an issue although no specific
finding mas1 have been made in reference to that
matter, aid although such matters were not directly
referred to in the pleadings.
1H1 Judgment £^713(2)
22Nk7l3C2j Most Cued ( ases
Uil Judgment £^720
228F720 Most Cited Cases
If the second action involves an issue .is to which the
judgment in a prior action is a conclusive
ad|iidicati,in. the estoppel, so lar as that issue is
concerned, extends to every matter which was or
might hase been urged to sus'ain or defeat the
determination actualh made.
[15| Stipulations ^---"MO
3o.3kl6 Most Cited Cases
An issue determined by stipulation rather than
judicial resolution is binding in a subsequent action if
the parties manifested an intention to that effect.
116] Judgment £~668(1)
r^NWioNCjJ Most ( died Cases
1161 Judgment £^6"8(1)
22,Xk(wSiy) Most Cited_Cas.es
Issue preclusion does not requi e that both cases
involve the same parties or their privies: rather, issue
preclusior applies even if onh the parts' against
whom the doctrine is asserted v\as a part) or in
priv its wiih a parts to the prior adjudication.
*12I5 D. Frank \\ dkins__ Chris K liogle. Salt Fake
Citv. lor plaintiff.
Allen K. Davis. Christopher S. Crump, Wade S.
\\ inegar. Scott 1. dembv. Salem, 'or defendants.
ON CIC-niORAKI J'OTIIF UTAH COURT ()l:
APPEAFS
Jy'iSSON. Associate Chief Justice
k*i On writ of certiorari, Neways, Inc.. Thomas l\
Mower, and Leslie D. Mower (collectively,
"Ncwa\s") seek teversal of the I tah Court of
Appeals' determination that Maoris & Associates'
("Macris" claims tor fraudulent transfer, successor
liability, and alter ego are not barred by res judicata.
Neways also claims that the court of appeals erred in
not consicerinu whether Macris is precluded h\ the
doctrine of ies judicata from pursuing additional
contract damages in the present action.
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back<;rouniui_-N!J
F\l. d he facts of the litigation and appeal
that led to this case can be found in AA.v^
A .-^^i.;f^ v Images cV Ul:;nJ,- ,6?c '-Ml
P 2o 636 a tah Ct,App.l/W7j
'*2 In August 1989, Macris entered into a
distributorship agreement (the "Agreement") with
Images & Attitude ("Images"). Pursuant to the
Agreement. MacrC was to use its time and marketing
expertise to build a "1216 "downline organization"
[F\_2_] within Images's multilevel marketing program.
The Agreement specified that Macris was
"autoqualified." which, the Agreement stated, meant
that the usual distributor requirements of the Images
marketing plan were waived and Macris was to be
paid at the highest level pros ided for in the
operation's marketing plan for product sales made b>
the distributors in Macris's downline I lie term, of
the Agreement was to continue "throughout the lite
of Images." as long as Macris was "active in
promoting Imaues and Images's products."
FN2. 1 he trial court described a "downline"
as follows
Multilevel marketing is promoted as an
opponunits to bring other people into a
business bs "sponsoring" them and sharing
in the profits that those people bring m bv
sponsoring other people creating what is
called a "downline." More people create a
tireater volume of sales upon which the
earlier sponsors receive a percentage as
compensation. There is an incentive to
build ar. organization (downline) so that
future income will be at a much greater
amount because of the volume created b>
the organization.
**3 Subsequently, on March 7. 1991. Macris
received a letter from Images informing Macris that
us autouuahfication status was being suspended for
lack of actis its Shorth thereafter, in a letter dated
March 29. !C>'M. Images informed Macris that it was
termmaiim: the Macris distributorship eutireh. The
reasons iiiven tor termination were Macris's testing ot
products after warnings not to do so, lack of activity
under the Agreement, and damaging activity to
Images and its distributor force.
~*4 Or. Apnl 1". 1991. Macris commenced an
action aeauist Images for breach of contract \"\hwr^
I "i. Much- aliened in that action that Images
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breached the distributorship agreement by wrongfully
suspending Macris's autoqualiflcation status and
terminating its distributorship, and that Macris was
entitled to damages as a result of that breach. Macris
sought to recover as breach of contract damages
("contract damages"! the payments it would have
received as Images's distributor but for Images's
wrongful termination of its distributorship. The
matter was set for trial on September 28. 1992.
**5 Approximate!) one month prior to trial, in
August 1992, Newavs. Inc was incorporated, with
'I nomas Mower as its president. It appears from the
record that Thomas Mower was the president of
Images up to the date on which Newavs was created,
whereupon he became the president of Neways.
[FN3J Dike Images, Newavs is a multilevel
marketing company engaged in the multilevel sale of
various health and beauty products. On September
!. 1992. Images ceased doing business a*- a multilevel
marketing companv and transferred most of its assets
to Neways. The new Is formed Nessa>s then took
over the multilevel marketing operations of Images.
FN3. In its Findings of fact, the trial court in
Macris I stated' "Thomas F Mower
founded [Images] and served as Us president
at least through August 3 1. 1C)L>2 "
"-6 The trial scheduled for September 28, 1992. in
Macn.s /, was continued bv the trial court and finally
went to trial without a jury on February 16. 1995,
over three years after Images transferred its assets to
Newavs. |FN4) I he trial court held that Images had
materially breached its contract with Macris by
wrongfully suspending Macris's autoqualiflcation
status and terminating its distributorship tor lack ot
actisits. and that Macris was entitled to damages tor
that breach. Images stipulated that it owed Macris
S360.681.20 in contract damages for subsequent
months, from March 1991 through August 31, 1992,
the date on which Images ceased doing business as a
multilevel marketing company. The trial court
awarded Macris all the contract damages contained in
the stipulation.
FN4. The original trial date of September
28, 1992. was continued by the trial court, as
a result of a conflicting trial calendar, to
January 25, 1993. On January 3, 1993. the
parties stipulated to a continuance of the
trial date because Judge Burmngham was
taking over the case from Judge Christensen.
After an additional continuance ot the trial
date bv the court because of its criminal
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calendar, trial was scheduled lor February
16. 1995.
**7 Just two da\ s prior tc the above-mentioned trial
in Maoris I- February 14. 1995-Macns tiled the
present action against Nevavs and its president and
vice president. 1hoiras and Leslie Mower {"Macns II
"). It '1217 is this case. Macns II. that is presently
before us on certiorari. In Macns II. Macris asserted
three claims in its complai it. First. Macris asserted a
claim for fraudulent transfer, under which Macris
alleged that Images's trans'er of its assets to Neways
was fraudulent pursuant to the Utah Fraudulent
Transfer Act, sec Utah Code Ann ^ 25-6-5 I 1998).
because it was made with actual intent to limit the
damages available to Mains and to hinder Macris
from collecting the obligation owed by Images.
Second, Macris asserted a successor liability claim,
under which Macns claimed that because Newavs is
the successor corporalioi of Images. Macris is
entitled to have Newavs held liable for all amounts
due as contract damages from Images to Macris
awarded in Macns 1. Finally. Macris asserted an alter
esio claim, under which Maoris claimed that there is
no corporate distinction between Images and Neways
and that the corporations have used the corporate
shield of Newavs to avoid liabilitv to Macris.
"KN Through the above-named claims, Macris
sought to recover the following damages against
Newavs: first. Macris sought payment bv Neways of
the contract damages awarded against Images in
Macris I; second, Macris sought additional contract
damages not awarded in Macris /, consisting of its
share of the profits from its downlines accruing after
September 1, 199?-the date on which Images
transferred its assets to Ntwavs; and third, Macris
sought punitive damages for the alleged fraudulent
transfer of Images's assets to Newavs.
**9 On October 19, 1995, Neways moved for
summary judgment, arguing that Macris s claims for
liaudulcnt transler, successor liabilitv, and alter ego
were barred bv res judical i. Specillcally. Newavs
armied that because Macris knew of its claims against
Newavs vears before the trial against Images began.
Macris could and should have included its claims
against Newavs in that actijn. Newavs also argued
that the doctrine of res judicata precluded Macris
from pursuing additional ccntract damages m Macris
II. because the issue of cortract damages arising out
of Images's l(<9| bread of the distributorship
agreement had already been fully litigated and
deckled in Macns I
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**I0 In response, Maciis argued that res judicata
was inapplicable to its claims 10 the extent they
sought to bind Newavs to the judgment rendered
against Images in Macns I and to the extent they
sought additional contract damages. Macris argued
that its claims against Neways arose after Macris
filed its camplaint in Macris / and tl at res judicata
was therefore inapplicable.
**11 Or November 14. 1995, Macris filed its own
motion for summary judgment, arguirg that because
Newavs admitted that it was the privy of Images for
res judicata purposes in its motion for summary
judgment, Macris should be granted a summary
judgment on its successor liability claim. In
response. Neways argued that although it admitted it
was the p ivy of Images for res judicata purposes, it
did not admit that it was the successor to Images's
liabilities to Maoris and that genuine issues of
material fact precluded summary juegment on this
issue
**I2 On September 19. 1997, the trial court issued
its memorandum decision on both motions for
summary judgment. UN-^J The court granted
Newavs summary judgment on its claim that res
judicata barred Macris's fraudulent transfer, successor
liabilitv. and alter ego claims lo the extent thev
sought "further damages from Neways as a result ot
the breached contract with Image;." The trial court.
however, refused to hold that res judicata precluded
Macris's claims to the extent they sought to bind
Neways to the judgment rendered against Images in
Macns I. The court also granted Macris summary
judgment on its claim that Neways was Images's
successor and was therefore liable for the previous
judgment against Images.
f\5. The memorandum decision contained
s atemeuts of fact and reached conclusions
of law.
"13 Newavs appealed, [fN'O] arguing to the court
of appeals that while the trial cour. correctly held that
res judicata precluded Macrii from pursuing
additional contract *I218 damages in Macns II, it
erred bv failing to applv the doctrine of res judicata
lo bar M; cris's claims to the extent thev sought to
make Neways liable for the previous judgment
against Images. Neways argued that all of Macris's
claims, including its successor liabilitv' claim, could
and should have been included in the previous action
against Images. Neways further argued that the trial
eourt erred in granting Macris a summars judgment
on its claim that Newavs was Images's successor and
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was therefore responsible to pas the damage-
awarded Macns in the previous lawsuit against
Images.
FN6_ Newavs appealed to this court, which
poured the case over to the court of appeals
pursuant to section 78-2-2(4). See Utah
>"pde__Ann,. >} . 78;2-2(4) ( I996): Utah
R.App.P 42(a).
"14 Macris cross-appealed, arguing that the trial
court ened in its determination that res judicata
precluded Macris from pursuing further contract
damages in Macns II Macris reasoned that because
Its claims against Neways arose after it tiled its
complaint against Images in Macns 1. res judicata
was inapplicable to its claims to the extent the}
sought to enforce the judgment entered in Macns I
and to the extent thev sought additional contract
damages.
"M5 The court ot" appeals reversed both summars
ltidmnents Sec A/,_-y_r^_jy_^Ais'i'_ilV A... VlLL'<aC,._C^ •
]990 CI Anjy 230. « r 14, 15. 986 I\2d_74S. In
reversim; the trial court's grant of summary judgment
m favor of Newavs. the court of appeals held that res
;udicata d:d not bar Macris's claims for fraudulent
transfer, successor liabilitv, and alter ego. 1 he court
reasoned that because the facts giving rise to Macris's
claims arose after Macns filed its amended complaint
in Macns I. the doctrine of res judicata was
inapplicable. In so holding, the court of appeals
evpressiv adopted the rule, citing several courts m
other jurisdictions,, that a party need only include
later claims in an action for res judicata purposes n
the partv was aware of the facts upon which the later
claims were based at the time the cmrlamt u^
flea Ihe court of appeals, however, did not address
the issue of whether res judicata bars Macris from
recovering additional contract damages in the present
action. In addition, the court of appeals reversed the
trial court's «rant of summary judgment in favor ot
Macns. holding that material issues ot fact precluded
summars judgment on Macris's claim that Newavs
was Images's successor in liability.
"16 Newavs tiled a petition for a writ of certiorari
with this court, seeking review of the decision of the
court of appeals. We granted the petition. Newavs
armies that the court of appeals erred in its
determination that the doctrine of res judicata does
not bar Macro's claims for fraudulent transfer.
successor liabilitv. and alter ego. In this regard.
Newavs raises tsvo arguments. First. Newavs argue^
that the court of appeals erred by adopting the res
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judicata test that a partv need include later claims in
an action only it' the party was aware of the tacts
upon which the later claims were based at the time
the complaint was filed. Second. Neways argues
that the court of appeals erred on review of the trial
court's decision by failing to address whether the
doctrine of res judicata precludes Macris from
pursuing additional contract damages-beyond those
awarded in Macris /--in the present action.
STANDARD OF UFA IEW
[1][2] **17 When exercising our certiorari
jurisdiction, "we review the decision ot the court of
appeals, not of the trial court." ('arner v. Pnhjech
Restoration, 944 P.2d 346. 3>0 (Utah 1997) (citing
'nuttcrticld v. Ohihn. 831 P.2d 9". 101 n. 2 jjjah
1992j). The court of appeals' determination of
whether res pidicata bars an action presents a
question of law. "When reviewing questions of law,
we accord no particular deference to the conclusions
ot law made bv the court of appeals but review them
for correctness." Stale v Chnstereen 866 P.2d 533,
5^5 1Utah 1993) (citing Alien v I 'rah iJef't <>f
Health. 850 P.2d 1267, 1269 iCtah 1993]; Landcs v.
1.990j|.
ANALYSIS
1. MACRIS'S FRAl'DF'FFN I TRANS! FR,
SUCCESSOR LIABILITY, AND AFTLR FGO
CLAIMS
"MS We first address Nessavs's argument that the
court of appeals erred in its determination that
Macris's claims for fraudulent M219 transfer.
successor liability, and alter ego are not barred by res
ludicata.
L;J[-1J **19 The doctrine of res judicata embraces
two distinct branches: claim preclusion and issue
preclusion. See S\\\uji^in\_Jjuen)ynmuun_Health
( 'are, 766 P.2d 1059. 1061 (Utah 1988). Claim
preclusion involves the same parties or their privies
and also the same cause of action. " 'and this
precludes the relitigation of all issues that could have
been litigated as well as those that were, in fact,
litigated in the prior action.' " Schaer v State, 657
P-2d 1337. 1340 (Utah 1983) (quoting Searle Bros v_
Sea/le. 588 P.2d o89. 690 fl taJ^JJOj) Issue
preclusion, on the other hand. " '.j'vit^ from a
different cause of action and prevents parties or their
privies from relitigating facts and issues in the second
suit that were fully litigated in the first suit.' " Id.
Iherefore. while both branches of res judicata "servef
] the important policy of preventing previously
litmated issues from h01112 rehtigated." different rules
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iiovern each branch. Salt Lah>' City v _SJIycr fork
"t^ril'J^ A'<cni---.±] ' .I^AJIL 7-^ £Ulah_ I^J
(citing Bcniod_y. \u Crearon_( 'rone, Inc.^i'69__P-2d
^7^_ 874-75. (Utah I9X3J,. Neways relies upon
claim preclusion in arguing that Macris's claims m
Macns II are barred by ies judicata because they
could and should have been included in the action
against Images in Macns I
L^J wil'20 In order for claim preclusion to bar a
subsequent cause of action, a plaintiff must satisfy
three requirements'
First, both cases must involve the same parties or
their privies. Second, the claim that is alleged to be
barred must have been presented in the First suit or
must be one that could ai d should have been raised
m the first action. I bird, the first suit must have
resulted in a Final judgment on the merits.
Madscn yJlorthick, 769 PJ2jd_245. ?47 Fljtah !(,K8)
(citiiiii I'cnroil 609 _l'_.2d_at__875; Bradsjiaw v
Aen/?l;io_627_P_2_d ^K^/JjT hah_l 98 1J; />:'_'/ Ac
s' Diuificid, ^' P c:d 5_15T_M0-]7 (l"_ta]_i_ |9?9j,
Krojchcek v_Do\\ncy State Bank, 580 P.2d 245. 244
(Utah 1978); Bc/lisloii v 'I cxaca, hie , 52_t_P.2d i79;
3S0(I'la_h 1974J; .Xat'l Bin Co. v Haley, 14 Utah 2d
263. 265-66. 382 P.2d 405. 407 (1903): UJheadon v
Bearso,,_]4_y_Uh 2d 45,_4_7\_ -0 p;\| o_46. 947-4S
(1967)). All three elements must be present tor
claim preclusion lo apply. Sec MailsenL 769|_P.2d at
"21 In reference to the second element of the test
outlined above, Ncskuvs aigued before the court ol
appeals that Macris's claims for fraudulent transfer,
successor liability, and alter ego "should have been
raised" in Macns I because Maoris knew of its claims
against Newavs before the trial in Macns /began and
should therefore have amended its complaint in that
action and asserted the claims now pursued in the
present action.
[6J **22 The court of appeals rejected Neways's
argument and held that the doctrine ot' claim
preclusion did not require Macris to litigate its claims
against Neways in Macris i because "the facts giving
rise lo Macris's claims against Neways ... arose alter
Macris tiled its amended c implaini against Images"
Macns (V •l-ss.'hs v Seu_i\;y hh __l 999 C f \pp
2}(k__ 14. 9_S_6 P.2d ^48. In so holding, the court of'
appeals adopted the rule thai a party is required to
include claims in an action for res judicata purposes
onlv if "those claims ... arose before the filing of the
complaint in the first action " /./.at*' 9.
**23 Newavs now armies before this court that the
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court of appeals erred in adopting the above-
mentioned test, and contends that this court should
adopt an alternate res judicata test requiring joinder
of all claims arising before entry of judgment where
the plaintiff has sufficient notice md opportunity to
join such claims. Neways contends that the res
judicata test adopted by the court of appeals is
inconsistent with this court's decision in Badger v
fiddlier, 6-Mltah "295, 25_4 P. 784 (l_9.27). and the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
**24 Newavs's reliance on Badger is misplaced. In
Badger, the defendant twice petitioned the trial court
for modification of a divorce decree. See Badger, 69
Utah at 2"6_-9'C 254 I1 at_._785-86 '1 he defendant's
first petition sought modification on tne ground lh.it
the property settlement on which the decree was
based was induced by th: plaintiffs
misrepresentations and omissions concerning *1220
his assets. See <>" 1 lah__a_L296-97, "154_P at 785.
The trial court modified the decree and ordered the
plamtitl to pay the defendant an additional amount
See 69 t jyth_ at 396,254 P..at..7_S5- S6. Two weeks
later, the defendant Filed a second petition, alleging
other misrepresentations that the plaintiff had
originally made. See 6_9_Ctah at 290-9?, 2M P_ aj
7S6. The plaintiff moved to strike the second
petition oi res judicata grounds, claaning that the
court's decision concerning the first aetitiou barred
relief on the second. Sec 69 Utah at 298-99, 254 P.
at 7S6 The trial court granted the motion. See 69
Utah at 299. 254 P. at 786. Or appeal, this court
afFirmed tie trial court's dismissa' of .he defendant's
second petition on res judicata grounds. In so
holding, this court staled:
It affirmatively is made to appear that at the time
the first petition was filed for a modification ot the
decree of divorce the defendant knew the contents
of said decree and that she was to receive no
property except that actually awarded to her...
I'l ]he appellant had as much knowledge about the
plaintiff's propertv and income at th ' time she filed
her first petition as she had at the time she filed the
[second| petition which was stricken.
69 Utajj_jrj_301, 2jyLJ\_ai_;7_87 (emphasis added).
Accordingly, Badger is consistent with the rule thai a
plaintiff need onlv include claims in a suit for res
judicata purposes if the plaintiff was aware of the
facts upon which the later chums were based at the
tune the first suit was filed,
**25 Lq.tally misplaced is Neways's argument that
the court ol appeals' decision creates contusion
between the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and the
doctrine of res judicata. According io Neways. the
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Utah Rules of Civil Procedure "clearly establish an
intent that pleadings ... should be amended as
additional facts and claims are discovered" and a rule
requiring amendment for resjudicata purposes should
therefore be adopted While the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure do allow tor the amendment of pleadings
to add additional parties or claims for relief, they o]o
not require it. See Utah R.Civ.P. 15(a) ("A party
mav amend his pleading ...." (emphasis added)):
Utah R (dv.P. 20(a) ("All persons may be joined in
one action as defendants ...." (emphasis added n
Therefore, it is clear that the rule espoused oy
Newavs. requiring that pleadings be amended lor res
judicata purposes as additional facts and claims are
discovered, would be inconsistent with the I tali
Rule-, of Civil Procedure. Accordingly, we affirm
the court of appeals' adoption of the rule that a party
is required to include claims in an action for re--
judicata purposes only if those claims arose before
the tlliim of the complaint in the first action.
"26 A m.mher of states and federal courts in other
luri-d:ctions addressing this issue have come to a
similar conclusion, holding that parties are required
to include claims in an action for res judicata
purposes onlv if those claims arose before the tiling
of the complaint in the earlier action. See j!cacir.r. v
Liankjn,snc.L_i_o>T , .1 2_S_F^3d_94. 9" Cd_Or.J ^"j.
('i.iH/y^,'^ Int'l Inc. v. Altai. Jul . '26 I .3d
265. ^o9-70_C2d ( ir 1997J; Doe v Allied Signal.
h\c_ t>S5_F.2d_908! 915__(7_th Cjr. ll>l>5.i: Manning v
Cm. •••' Ai<>juyn_ 9.5^ I .2d 1355. )3<>0_(i lth Or. 1^92 i.
Pdfc-a \ Sc^ariiv Pacific Brokers, /'v^_85C I22d
002. 6n9_L5jh__Cir.|9S8_); fos Angeles. JCaneh.
AAAL'IJ_v_Lm_ Angeles Unified Sc/l Ifst,^~p0 ! -l!
CM. "39 (9th Or 1984); /k/mo v_ ICWg A /)L
) .;,»:•/ /i.v 950 p 3d 5^4.j576 (Alaska__i^~J: />'"'''•
\ ,\T /<:._M> Uass. 5.8_^_5S" .P:2d .SjgT S15-F'*
iio"S). Puj_ra>!t_\ Oiia_n_ry\ first \'Cg _ Ine _ C
Idaho 55SC->03_P.3d 14~\ 14/9-50 (Ct:App.Lj_99.\), Ben
(' .lones A Co v Cammed Statesman Puhi'g (C_.
luo lev 32j3C)Q N.W. 701. 703 ( !9()"i.
i_"J "2" Apply in-; the test to the facts of this case,
the court of appeals was correct in concluding that res
judicata does not bar Macris's claims against Neways
for fraudulent tram-fer. successor liability, and alter
e'iio Jne facts giving rise to Macris's claims--
1mass's transfer of its assets to Neways ano
Newavs's subsequent takeover of Images's business-
did not arise until after the filing of the complaint in
Maern I Thus. Macris was not obligated to amend
r.-. complain: in Ma^n^ I to include the clamts now
"indued m the present action against Ness ays
"1221 |8|[9j "*28 Moreoser. for the doctrine of res
judicata to preclude a subsequent cause of action, run
onlv must the plaintiff have been aware of the cause
of action at the time the first suit was commenced.
but the cause of action in the present suit must be
identical to the one brought in the prior suit. See
Schaer, 657 P.2d at 134_0 (" 'In order for res judicata
to apply, both suits must involve the same parties or
their privies and also the same cause of action ....
"(quoting Scarlc Bros v Scarfc 5_88_ P.2_d._6_8_LC_69()
(Utah 1978])). In determining whether claims are
identical for res judicata purposes, this court has
focused on whether "[t]he two causes of action rest
on a different slate of facts and evidence of a
different kind or character is necessary to sustain the
two causes of action." Schaer. 65" P.2d at 1340. .sec
aBo 46 Ani.Jur-.2d _./jo^e/^'\^_.__534_j.l994j
(describing identity of facts or evidence test).
"Iherefore, even if a plaintiff is aware of the factual
basis of a suit at the tiling of another suit, he or she is
not obligated to bring all claims tugether if there is no
identitv of facts and ev idenee between the two
claims.
**29 Macris I arose out of the formation of a
distributorship agreement between Macns and
Images in August 1989 and Images's 1991 breach of
that agreement. In Macns I Macris and Images
Initialed whether an enforceable agreement existed
between the parties, whether Images breached that
Agreement, and the amount of damages that should
be awarded for that breach.
~*M) In contrast, Macns II arose out of the
formation of Neways in August 1992. the transfer by
Images of its assets to Neways on September 1, 1992,
three davs before the original trial date in Macns I,
and Newavs's subsequent takeover of Images's
multilevel marketing business Macris based its
claims in Macris II on the Utah Fraudulent Transfer
Act and similar common law doctrines designed to
protect creditors from the evasions of debtors.
Specifically. Macris claimed that Images's transfer of
its assets to Neways three days before the trial in
Macns 1 was scheduled to begin was fraudulent and
accomplished to limit the amount of damages
available to Macris and to hinder Macris horn
collecting the obligation owed by Images.
""31 Accordingly, it is clear that Macro's claims
against Neways in Macris II rest upon a different set
id' facts, and evidence of a different kind or character
is necessary to sustain the claims, than the breach of
contract litigation that was the subject of Macns I
iherefore, even if Macris had known of the relevant
(C 2005 Thomson West No Claim to Ong. U.S. (iovt. Works.
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facts of Macns II at the filing of Macns /-and it did
not-u still would have been justified in not including
lis fraudulent transfer, successor liability, and alter
ego claims in the first lawsi it.
II. ADDITIONAL CONITACI DAMAGFS
*"32 We next address Neways's argument that the
couri of appeals erred by failing to address the issue
raised on appeal of whether "res judicata" prevents
Macris from pursuing additional contract damages in
the present action- Macns ll
**}>}> In the proceeding below, the court ol appeals
determined that the claim preclusion branch ol the
doctrine of res judicata did not bar Macris's claims
for fraudulent transfer, successor liability, and alter
ego. "I he court of appeals, however, did not address
the issue of whether res judicata prevents Maoris
from pursuing additional contract damages not
recovered in Macns I through the above-named
claims Resolution of the drst issue does not resolve
the second.
**34 As noted above, the-e are two branches of res
judicata, claim preclusion and issue preclusion—also
known as collateral estoppel. .S't e Sv_aj_ns-tr»i v
lntermo,intain_ Health. Canity) _P 2d 1059i_.106l
(Utah 1988), The Ivsic diTerence between the two
branches of res judicata is simply put: while "claim
preclusion applies to wholt claims, whether litigated
or not," and prevents parties from relitigating the
same claim in a second su t. 18 James Win. Moore.
Moore's federal Practice § 131.1311] (Matthew
Bender, 3d ed.2.000) (emphasis added), issue
preclusion, or collateral estoppel, arises Irom a
different cause of action and prevents parties or their
privies from relitigating "rarticulai issues that have
been contested and resob ed." hi. see afu>
M222Schaci_v. State, 6_57_P.2d i 3 w. .1.340 (Ulah
19S3J: Searle Bros v Sgarle, 588 P;2d_689, 690
(Utah 1978j. "Thus, it is important lo recogm/e lh.it
although the doctrines o! [claim preclusion! and
[issue preclusion] are closely related, they are usually
mutually exclusive." Schat i\J->5" P.2d at !_34_0.
[10J **•)$ Accordingly, the court of appeals'
determination that Macris's claims are not barred by
claim preclusion does not preclude a determination
that Macris is prevented oy the doctrine of issue
preclusion or collateral estoppel from seeking,
additional contract damages arising out of Macris I
through its claims for fraudulent transfer, successor
liabilitv. and alter ego We agree with Neways,
therelore. that the court of appeals did err in failing to
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decide whether res judicata prevents Macris from
seeking additional contract damages in Macns I!
"*36 Because the court of appeals did not address
this issue, we could remand the mailer to the court ol
appeals for consideration. However, the issue has
been argued and briefed by both parties on certiorari,
and therefore, we are able to dispose of this issue
ourselves, and we elect to do so. See State v.
Brooks, 908_P.2d 856, 86]_JUlah W5). We thus
turn our attention to the merits of Neways's argument
that Macris is precluded by res judicata, more
speciIlealK the issue preclusion branch of res
judicata, |F_N7] from pursuing additional contract
d,images in this case.
fN_7 Despite Newavs's imprecise use of the
term "res judicata." its ar-Uiment concerning
additional contract damages, as explained
above, is properly analyzed under the issue
preclusion branch of the djctrine of res
judicata In any event, the claim preclusion
branch of the doctrine of ics judicata is
inapplicable to Neways s a'gument. Ihis
court has previously staled t mt "[i|n order
lor [claim preclusion] to apply, both suits
must involve ... the sanw arise of action"
Seal le Bros , 588 P.2d at <y90 (emphasis
added). In contrast, issue preclusion "arises
from a different cause of action and prevents
parties ... from relitigating ... issues in the
second suit that were fully litigated m the
first suit.'' Id (emphasis added) (citing Ray
y Consol. I rejght\vays: 4 Ut::h_2d_j 37. I4F
289 P.2d 19d. 199X1955]); see a/so Schaer
657_P.2d at 1340 ("Where the claim ... is the
same in both cases, claim preclusion]
applies. But where the claim ... is different
in the two cases, then [issue preclusion! is
applicable "I We have already determined
that Macris's claims for fraudulent transfer,
successor liability, and alter ego are
different than its breach of contract claim
raised in Maori'- I, see diicusdon supra part
1, in that the two causes ot' action rest on a
different slate of fads and evidence of a
different kind or characier is necessary lo
sustain the two causes of action. "I hus,
claim preclusion is inapplicable to Neways's
a'gument that Macris is barred from seeking
additional contract damages through the
anove-named claims.
[1 1JL12J **37 We apply a four-part test to
determine whether the doctrine of issue preclusion is
C 2005 fhomsoiiAVest. No Cdaim lo Ong,. U.S. (iovt. Works.
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applicable:
First, the issue challenged must be identical in the
previous action and in the case at hand. Second.
the issue must have been decided in a final
judgment on the merits in the previous action.
Third, the issue must have been competently, fully.
and fairly litigated in the previous action. Fourth.
the party against whom collateral estoppel is
invoked in the current action must have been either
a party or privy to a party in the previous action.
Jones li'aldr,. Holbrook <K- McDonough v Dawson.
923 P.2d 1366. 1370 (Utah 1996): .see also
Swainston, "66 P.2d at 1061. Ail four elements must
be present for issue preclusion to apply. See Jones,
HalJo. Holbrook A McDonough, 923 P.2d .at_J_370.
Macris does not argue that there is no "identity of
issues" for collateral estoppel purposes. Therefore.
our analysis focuses on the second, third, and fourth
elements. We address each element in turn.
A. Actually Litigated and Decided
""38 The second element outlined above requires
that the issue sought to be litigated in the present
action must have been decided in afinal judgment on
the merits in the previous action. See id. Macris
does not argue that the judgment entered in Macris I
was not a final judgment on the merits. Therefore.
our analysis, with respect to the second element
outlined above, focuses on whether the issue raised in
the present case was "actually asserted and tried" in
the prior proceeding. Int'l Res, v. Dunfield. 599 P.2d
?15. 5P (Utah 1979).
* 1223 **39 In Macris I, the trial court determined
that a valid distributorship agreement existed
between Macris and Images, that Images breached
the Agreement, and that Macris was entitled to
damages as a result of that breach. Accordingly, the
trial court awarded Macris damages in the amounts
Images stipulated that it should have paid Macris for
subsequent months, from March 1991 through
August 31. 1992, the date on which Images ceased
doing business as a multilevel marketing company.
In Macris II. Macris sought to litigate whether it was
entitled to additional contract damages not recovered
in Macns I arising after the date Images transferred
its assets to Neways.
[13][ 14 j ""40 Macris argues that because the trial
court limited its award of damages to August 31.
1992. the issue of Macris's entitlement to damages
accruing after August 31, 1992. was never actually
litigated or decided in Macris I. Clearly, if an issue is
actually raised by proper pleadings and treated as an
issue in a case, it is conclusively determined by the
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first judgment. See Int'l Res.. 599 P.2d at 517.
However, the preclusive effects of the doctrine of
collateral estoppel go further.
The general rule precluding the relitigation of
material facts or questions which were in issue and
adjudicated in a former action is applicable to all
matters essentially connected with the subject
matter of the litigation. This application of the
general rule extends to questions necessarily
involved in an issue ... although no specific finding
may have been made in reference to that matter,
and although such matters were not directly
referred to in the pleadings.
46 Am.Jur.2d Judgments i 545. It follows,
therefore, that a party cannot by negligence or design
withhold issues and litigate them in separate actions.
If the second action involves an issue as to which the
judgment in a prior action is a conclusive
adjudication, the estoppel, so far as that issue is
concerned, extends to every matter which was or
might have been urged to sustain or defeat the
determination actually made. See id.
**41 The issue of damages resulting from Images's
1991 breach of contract was decided in Macris I.
Moreover, the effect of the trial court's award of
damages in Macris I embodied all damages: past,
present, and prospective. The Restatement supports
this view, reasoning:
Typically, even when the injury caused by an
actionable wrong extends into the future and will
be felt beyond the date of judgment, the damages
awarded by the judgment are nevertheless
supposed to embody the money equivalent of the
entire injury. Accordingly, if a plaintiff who has
recovered a judgment against a defendant in a
certain amount becomes dissatisfied with his
recovery and commences a second action to obtain
increased damages, the court will hold him
precluded; his claim has been merged in the
judgment and may not be split. It is immaterial
that in Irving the first action he was not in
possession of enough information about the
damages, past or prospective, or that the damages
turned out in fact to be unexpectedly large and in
excess of the judgment.
Restatement (Second) of Judgments S 25 cmt. c
(1982) (emphasis added). Moreover, the trial court
made no finding that its award of damages in Macris
I was not final. Therefore, because the trial court's
award of damages in Macris I was a conclusive
adjudication on the issue of damages resulting from
Images's 1991 breach of the autoqualiflcation
agreement, the issue of damages accruing after
August 1992 was connected to the subject matter and
€) 2005 Thomson West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.
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necessarily decided in Mattis I.
**42 Macris further argues that because the issue of
contract damages was decided by stipulation, it was
not actually litigated and decided for collateral
estoppel purposes.
[I5J **43 An issue determined by stipulation rather
than judicial resolution is binding in a subsequent
action if the parties manifested an intention to that
effect. Sec, e.g., 18 Charles A. Wright, Arthur R.
Miller & F.dward H. Cooper, Federal Practice and
Procedure § 4443, at 382 (1981) ( "Issue preclusion
does not attach unless it is clearly shown that the
parties intended that the is>ue be foreclosed in other
litigation."): 18 James Win Moore, Moore's
Federal Practice M224 § 132.03|2][hj[ii] (Matthew
Bender, 3d ed. 2000) ("[S lipulation may be binding
in a subsequent action ... r the parties ... manifested
an intention to that effect."). In this case, Macris
does not argue that th: stipulation concerning
contract damages was not binding in general: rather,
Macris argues that the stipjlation was not binding as
to damages accruing after August 31, 1992. the date
on which Images transfer "ed its assets to Neways.
However, if the stipulation is meant to be final as to
some damages but not final as to other damages, it
must say so. Our review of the record in this case,
however, evidences no such intention. Moreover, the
trial court made no finding that its damages award-
which was based on the parties stipulation—was not
final as to all damages, "herefore, we find that the
stipulation in this case has -es judicata effect.
B. Full and Fair Opportunity to Litigate
**44 In reference to the third element outlined
above, we must determine whether "the issue in the
first case [was] competently, fully, and fairly
litigated." See Swain.iton, _166 _P.2d__at [061
(citations omitted). MacrC argues that the issue of
contract damages accruing after August 31, 1992,
was not "competently, fully and fairly litigated"
because Neways's fraudu ent takeover of Images's
business prevented Macris from litigating such
damages. However, the record clearly establishes
that Macris was aware of Images's transfer of its
assets to Neways almost a year before Macris filed its
last pleading in Macris 1 aid two and one-hatf years
before the trial. During this two- and one-half-year
period. Macris enjoyed ample opportunity to conduct
unimpeded discovery and to fully develop its claim
for damages by examining Neways's financial
records. Had Mac "is conducted discovery
concerning future damages, it surely could have
included that evidence in the figures presented lo the
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trial court. Thus, it seems fair to sU.tc that Macris
had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue of
damages accruing after August 31, 1992. in the prior
adjudication.
C. Privity
\ 1_6J **4fi Finally, the fourth clement of the test
outlined above also permits tae application of
collateral estoppel in this case. Unlike the doctrine
of claim preclusion, issue preclusion does not require
that "both cases ... involve the same parties or their
privies." Madsen. 769 P.2d 245, 247 (Utah 1988)
(emphasis added). Rather, issue preclusion applies
even if only "the party against whom the [doctrine] is
asserted [was] a party or in privity with a party to the
prior adjudication." Swainston, 766 P.2d at 1061;
see also Wilde v. Mid-Century Ins. Co.. 635 P.2d417,
419 (Utah 1981) ("[nfjutuality of parties is no longer
essential" for collateral estoppel purposes). In this
case, although Neways was a nonparty to Macris I.
the party against whom the doctrine of collateral
estoppel is asserted is Macris. It is clear that Macris
H, Associates, the plaintiff herein, is the same party as
Macris <\: Associates, the plaintiff in Macris I
Therefore, the party against whom the doctrine is
asserted—Macris—was a party to the prior
adjudication.
**46 On the basis of the foregoing, it is clear that all
of the recuirements of collateral estoppel have been
satisfied. Consequently, Macris is precluded from
relitigating the issue of damages arising from
Images's breach of the distributorship agreement in
this case.
CONCLUSION
**47 We conclude that the co.irt of appeals
correctly determined that Macris's claims for
fraudulent transfer, successor liability, and alter ego
are not barred by the doctrine of res Judicata. In so
holding, we affirm the court of appeals' adoption of
die res judicata test that a plaintiff need only include
later claims in an action for res judicata purposes if
the plaintiff was aware of the facts upon which the
later claims are based at the time the complaint was
filed. We further conclude, however, that Macris is
precluded by the issue preclusion branch of the
doctrine of res judicata from seeking additional
contract carnages through the above-named claims.
**48 Chief Justice HOWL, Just.ce DURHAM,
Justice [)i;RRANT. and Justice WJJ,KINS concur in
Associate Chief Justice RUSSON'S opinion.
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